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Ajay K. Mehrotra
The intellectual foundations
of the modern American ½scal state

At the turn of the twentieth century,

the U.S. system of public ½nance underwent a dramatic structural transformation. The late-nineteenth-century system of indirect national taxes–associated mainly with the highly partisan
tariff and regressive excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco–was eclipsed in the
early twentieth century by a professionally administered, graduated income tax
that soon accounted for more than half
of all federal tax revenue. This seismic
shift toward direct and progressive taxation marked the emergence of a new
½scal polity, one guided not simply by
the functional need for revenue, but by
social concerns about justice, fairness,
and the equitable distribution of ½scal
obligations.
The intellectual debates and political struggles that took place a century ago inform our current discussions
about “fundamental” tax reform. In
recent years, American scholars, policy
analysts, and lawmakers have decried
the failings of the present U.S. tax system. At the same time, commentators
have identi½ed how the recent rise in
inequality has signaled the arrival of
a new Gilded Age in the United States.
In an attempt to confront this increas© 2009 by Ajay K. Mehrotra

ing concentration of wealth and power, some present-day reformers have
vowed to make profound changes to
our existing progressive income and
wealth-transfer taxes. A century ago,
during a similar period of rising inequality, serious structural reform was
not only envisioned but also achieved,
and we would do well to recall the social and economic conditions, as well
as the political will, that made that fundamental ½scal reform possible.
In the early twentieth century, the
modern American ½scal state turned
to direct and graduated taxes to reallocate the economic responsibilities of
½nancing an emerging regulatory and
administrative, social-welfare state.
But the reformers who sought to usher
in a new ½scal order intended to use
tax laws and policies for much more:
to rede½ne the meaning of modern citizenship; to facilitate a fundamental
change in existing political arrangements; and, perhaps most important,
to help underwrite the expansion of
the American liberal state. To do all
of this, tax activists understood that
they needed to lay an intellectual foundation in support of direct and progressive taxation.
Among the critical reformers, a particular group of academic experts played a
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pivotal role in recon½guring the meaning and implications of taxation. In a
subtle, though signi½cant, move, these
economic and political theorists helped
to supplant the prevailing “bene½ts theory” of taxation, and its attendant vision of the state as a passive protector
of private property, with a more equitable principle of taxation based on one’s
“faculty” or “ability to pay,” which demanded a more active role of the positive state. Led by the likes of Richard T.
Ely, Henry Carter Adams, and Edwin
R. A. Seligman, these German-trained,
professional political economists helped
dismantle the nineteenth-century orthodox theories of laissez-faire and promoted the adoption of new, more effective
and egalitarian forms of taxation and
state action.
The thinkers who led the movement for direct and graduated taxation
emerged from similar backgrounds and
experiences. Many were reared in the
deeply religious environment of Northeastern evangelical Protestantism, and
even those who distanced themselves
from organized religion channeled their
theological and ethical inclinations into
their academic work and public advocacy.1 German training and experience,
moreover, bolstered their moral orientation. They, like many other aspiring
American scholars, turned to German
universities and mentors for their professional training in the social sciences,
learning ½rsthand from some of the
leading ½gures of the German historical
school of economics about how historical and institutional development affected the so-called “natural” laws of political economy. And as part of their education outside the classroom, they learned
about the promise and perils of the modern European social-welfare state.2
These scholars returned to the United
States troubled by the excesses of lateDædalus Spring 2009

nineteenth-century American industrial capitalism. The labor unrest and class
conflict that resulted from the modern
forces of mass migration, rapid industrialization, and uneven economic growth
forti½ed the economists’ reformist tendencies. Although they realized that they
could not graft European social democracy onto American political culture, the
progressive political economists sought
to link the highbrow theories of the
academy with the material world of the
working masses.3 They did this, in part,
by challenging the prevailing system of
political and economic thought and providing a new conceptual foundation for
new forms of taxation. Eschewing timeless universalisms, these academic theorists believed that economic relations
were embedded in a larger social and institutional matrix, one constituted mainly by law and legal processes. Thus many
of the leading progressive political economists were eager to use law and legal
institutions to exercise the “ethical agency” of state power. In this way, many of
these thinkers were part of what legal
historians have identi½ed as the “First
Great Law & Economics Movement.”4

The intellectual movement for progressive taxation, guided by the new generation of professional economists, was
part of a much larger transformation
in American social thought at the turn
of the century, often referred to as a
“revolt against formalism.” Shifting
the justi½cation for taxation from the
bene½ts theory to the ability-to-pay
principle delegitimized past standards
of rigid economic thought and facilitated new ways of thinking about the social processes of modern life. This consequential transition profoundly affected the development of American liberalism, turning it away from its classical
emphasis on negative individual liber-

ties and toward a new focus on collective, positive rights.5
For many of the progressive political economists, bene½ts theory and
the ability-to-pay principle were contending doctrines with fundamentally different underlying social and political theories. The bene½ts doctrine
stood for the outmoded proposition,
in the progressives’ view, that taxation
was justi½ed as a price paid for goods
and services provided by government
in exchange for tax payments. Under
the bene½ts theory, individuals paid
taxes to ensure that the neutral and limited state could provide citizens with
physical and ½nancial security, not
only from each other, but from the public powers of the state. The Michigan
jurist and treatise writer, Thomas M.
Cooley, typi½ed this line of thought.
“The citizen and the property owner
owes to the government the duty to
pay taxes,” Cooley proclaimed, so
“that the government may be enabled
to perform its functions, and he is supposed to receive his proper and full
compensation in the protection which
the government affords to his life, liberty and property, and in the increase
to the value of his possessions by the
use to which the money contributed is
applied.”6 Citizens, in essence, traded
tax payments solely for the bene½ts
that they received from the state.
The bene½ts theory equated taxes
with commercial transactions. Members of a polity had no social obligations or civic duties beyond the quid
pro quo of paying taxes and receiving
governmental protection. If taxation
was one of the most commonly and
consistently experienced relationships
between Americans and their government, bene½t theory appeared to limit
that important relationship–and the
civic identity that emerged from it–

to the cash nexus. Fiscal citizenship itself was reduced to a commodity.
In criticizing the bene½ts principle,
the progressive political economists emphasized its anachronistic implications.
Challenging Cooley directly, Richard Ely
claimed that taxes could not be justi½ed
based on “the old ½ction of reciprocity.”
Ely was careful in explaining that taxes
were “not exchanges” or “payments”
for public goods and services. “The sovereign power demands contributions
from citizens regardless of the value of
any services which it may perform for
the citizen,” wrote Ely in his 1888 tax
treatise.7
As students of the German historical
school of economics, progressive thinkers like Ely applied a thoroughgoing historicism to their analysis of contemporary American political economy and
tax policy. Thus, Henry Carter Adams
boldly derided classical bene½ts theory
for ignoring how “the modern State . . .
assumes duties far beyond the primitive
functions of protection to life and property.” Although such a “quid pro quo
theory of taxation may have served fairly
well under conceptions of governmental
activity held in the early part of the century,” Adams argued in 1898, “it must be
regarded at present as somewhat antiquated.”8
Edwin Seligman, the leading authority
on progressive taxation, condemned the
social theory underpinning the bene½ts
principle in even starker terms. Like Ely
and Adams, Seligman maintained that
the bene½ts doctrine was based, at its
core, on an obsolete conception of citizenship:

The intellectual foundations of the
modern
American
½scal state

It is now generally agreed that we pay
taxes not because the state protects us,
or because we get any bene½ts from the
state, but simply because the state is a
part of us. . . . In a civilized society the
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state is as necessary to the individual as
the air he breathes; unless he reverts to
stateless savagery and anarchy he cannot live beyond its con½nes. . . . To say
that he supports the state only because it
bene½ts him is a narrow and sel½sh doctrine. We pay taxes not because we get
bene½ts from the state, but because it
is as much our duty to support the state
as to support ourselves or our family;
because, in short, the state is an integral
part of us.9

Simply put, the progressive economists
used taxation as a means to renegotiate
the social contract between citizens
and their state. Instead of relying on abstract economic relations based on market transactions to justify taxation, they
turned to social relations and the interdependent reality of modern social and
political life to explain the need for direct and graduated taxes.

The progressive theorists’ uni½ed dis-

dain for the bene½ts principle did not
translate, however, into a single universal vision of the ability-to-pay doctrine.
Adams, who believed in distinguishing
between the theoretical justi½cation
for taxation and the “lawyer’s point of
view,” relied on what he referred to as a
“contributory theory of a tax.” Progressive taxation was justi½ed under such
a theory because it embodied the ethical duty of social unity that citizens of
a polity owed to each other and to the
larger commonwealth. Unlike the prevailing “purchase theory” or bene½t
theory of tax, which emphasized a solitary, atomistic, and consumerist relationship between the citizen-taxpayer
and the state, Adams argued that a contributory theory was based on “solidarity of social interest.” For him, a “sense
of organic unity and of interdependence,
and consciousness of common rights
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and common duties, go along with the
idea of contribution.”10
Ely pushed further in emphasizing the
link between social solidarity and taxation. Quoting approvingly from a Massachusetts Tax Commission report, he
wrote: “All the enjoyments which a man
can receive from his property come from
his connection with society. Cut off from
all social relations a man’s wealth would
be useless to him. In fact, there could be
no such thing as wealth without society.”11 Seligman took a slightly different
approach. Although he agreed that the
social interdependence occasioned by
modern industrialism had displaced the
logic of autonomous individualism, he
maintained that the triumph of the ability-to-pay principle was the culmination
of a long and gradual historical process
driven mainly by class dynamics. “Amid
the clashing of divergent interests and
the endeavor of each social class to roll
off the burden of taxation on some other
class, we discern the slow and laborious
growth of standards of justice in taxation, and the attempt on the part of the
community as a whole to realize this justice,” proclaimed Seligman. “The history of ½nance, in other words, shows the
evolution of the principle of faculty or
ability to pay–the principle that each individual should be held to help the state
in proportion to his ability to help himself.”12
To be sure, the practical application of
the ability-to-pay principle had its limits. Accurately measuring a citizen’s ability to pay taxes was a controversial issue
that remained rather elusive–then and
now.13 But the progressive economists
contended that their primary, pragmatic
tax reform objective was not to recommend an unassailable ½scal system based
on the principle of ability to pay. Rather,
they aimed to demonstrate the theoretical limitations inherent in the bene½ts

principle. That is not to say that they
thought the bene½ts principle had no
place in tax-policy discussions; their
goal instead was to make more explicit the political and social theory implicit in the dueling tax notions and,
in the process, create support for a reform movement. In this sense, the political economists, like other progressive activists, used the language of ethical duties and the idiom of social solidarity “less to clarify a political philosophy than to build a political constituency.”14

C

reating a social and political movement for tax reform also meant reaching an audience beyond the academy.
The progressive economists thus realized that the power of their ideas alone
was often not enough to change the
laws and institutions that undergirded
the American ½scal system. They needed to take a more active role in the political and policy-making process by
participating as consultants and parttime tax commissioners, and by capturing the attention of lawmakers.
Just as the economists and other
social scientists were promoting their
ideas, the American political system itself was undergoing a profound transformation. The nineteenth-century political structure of “courts and parties”
was giving way to a more fractured
and pluralistic system of American
statecraft. The rise of a more competitive political process and greater reliance on expert administration challenged the traditional control of party
politics and patronage.15 By linking a
graduated income tax to tariff reform,
tax activists were able to help move
½scal policy away from party politics
and toward administrative expertise.
With this shift, reform-minded economic experts joined organizations

like the National Tax Association, the
leading professional association of
public ½nance experts, and other civic
groups to provide an outlet for their
ideas.
To make their ideas palatable for
the public, the progressive economists
needed to navigate between the two prevailing political positions on taxation.
In leading the conceptual campaign for
progressive tax reform, they needed to
defend their ideas against economic
and political conservatives who wanted
to maintain the status quo, and against
the seemingly radical populist calls for
a more dramatically redistributive ½scal system.
Political conservatives, wedded to a
classical, night-watchman view of the
state, equated the move to graduated
income and wealth-transfer taxes with
creeping socialism. The conservative
critic David A. Wells, for instance, contended that, except in the case of war
½nancing, there was no place in a free
republic for any form of graduated taxes based on the ability to pay. Although
Wells, the former commissioner of Internal Revenue during the Civil War,
was well aware of the importance of
using taxes to fund an army and build
a nation, he, like many old-guard commentators, opposed progressive taxation adamantly. “Any government,
whatever name it may assume, is a despotism, and commits acts of flagrant
spoliation,” declared Wells, “if it grants
exemptions or exacts a greater or lesser
rate of tax from one man than from another.” Arguing that graduated taxes
of any sort were a form of emasculating
charity, Wells concluded that “equality
and manhood, therefore, demand and
require uniformity of burden in whatever is the subject of taxation.”16 The progressive economists observed ½rsthand,
often to their personal and professional
Dædalus Spring 2009
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detriment, the overwhelming power that
critics like Wells held, particularly in delineating the bounds of academic freedom.
Conservative hostility to progressive
tax reform, however, spread beyond social commentators and the academy
and into legal institutions of power.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a rather
surprising decision for contemporaries,
struck down as unconstitutional the 1894
income tax, the ½rst peace-time measure of its kind. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen J. Field illustrated
the anxiety with which elites viewed
the progressive tax movement. “The
present assault on capital is but the beginning,” wrote Field. “It will be but
the stepping-stone to others, larger
and more sweeping, till our political
contests will become a war of the poor
against the rich; a war constantly growing in intensity and bitterness.”17
Addressing these conservative opponents, the progressive economists
sought to demonstrate that support
for graduated taxes could be compatible with traditional American notions
of equality and fairness. This required
½rst showing that critics had erroneously assumed that “progressive taxation
necessarily implies socialism and con½scation.” Citing David Wells’s writings explicitly, Seligman claimed, “[I]t
is quite possible to repudiate absolutely the socialistic theory of taxation and
yet at the same time advocate progression.”18
To do so, Seligman and his like-minded colleagues turned to marginal utility analysis, an increasingly popular
economic concept in the European and
American academy at the time. A variant of neoclassical economics, marginalism held that the value of a commodity was based upon the subjective worth,
or utility, a consumer ascribed to it. This
Dædalus Spring 2009

value, in turn, depended upon how
much of the commodity the consumer already had. Each additional, or marginal, unit of a commodity, including
money, was believed to be of lesser value than the previous unit.19 The progressive tax theorists used the notion
of the diminishing marginal utility of
money to contend that progressive taxation, in fact, entailed an equality of sacri½ce among taxpayers. “Strict equality
of sacri½ce in the sense of relatively proportional diminution of burden,” wrote
Seligman, “thus involves progressive
taxation.”20

The use of marginalism to decouple

graduated taxation from state socialism
may have persuaded some critics. But
the reform-minded economists faced
a more amorphous, though equally formidable, kind of opposition from the political left, where the populist attraction
to Henry George’s single-tax theory distracted important constituencies away
from the progressive tax reform movement. In defusing this opposition, the
tax theorists attempted to debunk the
amateur economic analysis conducted
by George and his disciples and to unmask the “ultra conservative” social
theory that underpinned George’s call
for a single-tax on land.
In his enormously popular 1879 book,
Progress and Poverty, and in other writings, Henry George advocated for a
levy only on increases in land value–
a single-tax on what George referred
to as the “unearned increment” of appreciated land. George’s idea quickly
captured the imagination of contemporary social movements. As early as 1885,
Richard Ely observed that “tens of thousands of laborers have read Progress and
Poverty, who have never before looked
between the two covers of an economic
book.”21

Henry George and the single-tax appealed to a variety of grassroots, populist
groups as an attack on land speculators
and monopolists. Yet as the progressive
economists noted, the single-tax in particular and George’s political philosophy
in general were premised on a conservative, if not reactionary, view of individualism. George argued that the fruits
of individual labor belonged to the individual and the state had very little role
to play in economic or social matters
beyond levying a single-tax on land. At
its core, George’s single-tax appeared
to be a narrow application of the bene½ts principle: landowners owed a duty
to the state because it was the state that
protected the private property rights of
landowners.
The tax experts not only ridiculed
George as an “unscienti½c” amateur,
they also denounced the single-tax as
an infeasible solution to the many ills
of modern industrialism. At the 1890
American Social Science Association’s
conference dedicated to the single-tax,
Seligman joined other professional political economists in berating George’s
“schemes” as “repugnant to our moral
sense and repellant to our logic.” Similarly, Ely depicted George as “an ultra
conservative, for he does not believe in
taxes at all, but holds them to be robbery. . . . The truth is, there is in modern
society no such individual production
as Mr. George assumes. What have I
produced alone and unaided? Nothing.”22 In sum, nearly all professional
tax experts loathed George’s single-tax
as a hopelessly reactionary panacea.
If the progressive economists did not
take George’s analysis of taxation seriously, they were compelled to contend
with other forces on the political left advocating for a more radically redistributive ½scal system. American socialists,
pointing to the experience of European

nations, called for steeply graduated
taxes on income and wealth as a means
to confront the growing disparity of
wealth and opportunity that accompanied industrial capitalism. The progressive tax reformers responded that American political culture posed serious institutional constraints on the adoption of
European-style social democracy in the
United States. Even Seligman, who discredited bene½ts theory because it elided
the social connections between citizens
and their state, recoiled at the implications of radically redistributive tax laws
and policies:
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From the principle that the state may
modify its strict ½scal policy by considerations of general utility, to the principle that it is the duty of the state to redress all inequalities of fortune among
its private citizens, is a long and dangerous step. It would land us not only in socialism, but practically in communism.23

B

y operating between the two opposing political camps–between the conservative critics who equated graduated
taxes with socialism and the populist reformers who advanced a seemingly more
radical form of taxation–tax reformers
sought to demonstrate that progressive
taxation was, in fact, an assault on privilege and concentrations of wealth that
did not amount to a move toward state
socialism. This was no easy task. It required the progressive tax theorists to
stake out a fragile intermediary position
that subsequently afforded lawmakers
and policy analysts an opportunity to
make the existing system of public ½nance more transparent and fair, without threatening the fundamental prerogatives of American political culture.
The Supreme Court’s decision striking
down the 1894 tax law gave reformers an
opportunity to forge their intermediary
Dædalus Spring 2009
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position. Although the decision was a
formidable institutional obstacle, it did
not mark the end of the progressive tax
reform movement; instead, it galvanized tax activists to seek a constitutional amendment nullifying the Court’s
holding. Rati½cation of the Sixteenth
Amendment was a long and arduous
process, and the progressive economists played a key role in convincing
state legislators of the amendment’s
popular appeal. In 1913, soon after the
amendment’s ½nal rati½cation, the federal government adopted the country’s
½rst permanent progressive income
tax. With relatively high exemption
levels and moderately graduated rates,
this tax law initially affected only a
small fraction of the U.S. population
and raised little revenue. But the law
led the way in the rise of a new ½scal
order.24
Ultimately, the moderate theoretical
and political position taken by the progressive tax experts influenced lawmakers. As Congressman Cordell Hull (DTennessee), one of the chief architects
of the 1913 law, explained: “I have no
disposition to tax wealth unnecessarily or unjustly, but I do believe that the
wealth of the country should bear its
just share of the burden of taxation and
that it should not be permitted to shirk
that duty.”25 For reformers and lawmakers, then, progressive taxation implied
that wealth in an industrial society was
a social product, and that the distribution of social obligations ought to bear
some resemblance to the distribution
of social rewards.
Despite modest beginnings, the federal government soon vigorously employed its newfound ½scal powers. In
response to World War I, the government established a series of revenue
laws that dramatically expanded the
scale and scope of the national tax
Dædalus Spring 2009

system. The sheer demand for wartime revenue was certainly an important determinant of this ½scal revolution, but the progressive theorists’ concerns about social justice and the distributional impact of American tax
laws were equally signi½cant. Building
on the progressive economists’ conceptual foundation, U.S. Treasury Department of½cials, many of whom were
lawyers, sought to highlight the importance of ½scal citizenship to the ½nancing of the war. These lawyers-turnedgovernment administrators attempted
to ensure that the physical sacri½ces
made by those who fought the war were
matched by ½scal sacri½ces from the affluent, who often bene½ted from the robust war economy. The astronomically
high marginal and effective income tax
rates, and the enactment of an inheritance tax and innovative levies on wartime business pro½ts, illustrated that a
new “soak-the-rich” form of taxation
was taking shape. Indeed, by the end of
the war levies on income and pro½ts had
come to dominate federal revenues.26
Although the World War I tax system
was scaled back as part of the general
retrenchment of the 1920s, the Progressive Era foundation of the graduated income tax remained remarkably resilient,
and thus provided subsequent reformers with a conceptual base upon which
to build. Another world war would trigger the second major transformation in
twentieth-century American tax policy,
replacing the existing “class tax” with a
“mass tax” that reached a broad swath of
middle-class wage earners.27 But by the
end of the 1920s, the intellectual, emotional, and cultural spade work had been
accomplished; the foundations of a new
½scal polity were ½rmly established.
The new ½scal order that emerged at
the turn of the century was by no means
a radical system of wealth redistribution,

nor was it merely a conservative bulwark against more dramatic reform.
Instead, the modern American ½scal
state that emerged in the early twentieth century dramatically altered the
distribution of ½scal burdens along
the lines of both class and region. In
the process, this new polity fundamentally reconstituted the meaning of modern citizenship, the existing regime of

American statecraft, and the range of
possibilities for robust government action. This transformation was, ultimately, a quali½ed success. Although it did
not go as far as some social democratic
reformers had envisioned, this new ½scal polity laid the foundation for and
held the promise of a new, more progressive American state.
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